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Motive and Rightness
"Does the motive from which an action is performed ever determine whether that action is morally
right or morally wrong" (vi)? In Motive and Rightness, Steven Sverdlik's answer is a qualified 'yes.'
Somewhat surprisingly, he also contends that some version of extrinsic consequentialism provides
the best theoretical account of why this is the case. Though he has "tried to present the material in
a way that [is] comprehensible to an educated reader," he notes that the issues are often highly
abstract and hence there are portions an "education reader should probably skip" (vi). The
resulting book is likely to be of interest primarily to ethical theorists and moral psychologists. But it
also develops a highly nuanced account of what it means for moral motives to be "available" to an
agent which counseling psychologists may appreciate too.
Sverdlik contends that any acceptable moral theory should yield a "largely objective conception of
deontic status" (16). By this he means that the moral rightness, wrongness or permissibility of an
action cannot depend on the agent's beliefs about it. Rather, it depends on facts about the
situation, most of which are completely external to or independent of the agent in question. Since
motives are subjective features of agents, this means that they can only be one of the relevant
factors in any complete explanation of what agents morally ought to do. Importantly, Sverdlik does
not argue that motives are always relevant to the deontic status of acts (he acknowledges, for
example, that agents frequently act rightly even when they do so from a bad motive). But he does
believe there are some actions that, while morally right when performed from one motive, would be
wrong if performed from another. This belief is supported through examples of actions motivated
by (i) the desire for money, (ii) cruelty, and (iii) prejudice.
Chapter 2 shores up these claims by clarifying the nature of motives, which Sverdlik defines as
"ultimate desires" that establish "the agent's end in acting" (19). Here the distinction between
explanatory and normative reasons is crucial. Motives can explain why an agent acted as he or
she did -- why she thought a particular end worth pursuing, or why he decided to perform one
action rather than another. But motives do not serve as justifying reasons on their own, since the
fact that an agent believes he should perform a particular act does not tell us anything about
whether those beliefs are correct. Sverdlik further notes that motives can only serve as intentions
when they are conscious, and points out that the typical relation between motive and action is
"many many" (the same action can have many different motives, and the same motive can lead to
many different acts). These and other distinctions are used to clarify exactly how motives are
relevant in the three examples mentioned above. For example, it is only in cases where money is
an agent's "ultimate desire" that Sverdlik thinks it can count as potentially wrong-making. And even
then, the desire for money is only one of the relevant factors in determining whether the action
itself is right or wrong.
The explicit goal of Chapters 3-7 is to see "if some substantive moral theory can explain" why
motives are relevant in this limited way (p. 41) though exactly how they are relevant is also further
clarified by the discussion. These chapters are extremely technical, and only the broadest outlines
will be covered here. Pace classical utilitarianism, and other versions of consequentialism that
make the moral status of an action depend solely on its effects, he argues that motives sometimes
do have extrinsic value. Suppose, for example, that my refusal to shake another person's hand is
motived by racism. That avoiding contact with members of that race is my "ultimate end" may not
be apparent in every circumstance (for example, if I also have a cast on my right arm, it may not be
evident that may failure to shake hands is snub), but when it is evident the other person will feel
the pain of being victimized by prejudice. This is a negative consequence, and therefore can
change the moral status of the act. Nonetheless, Sverdlik thinks kantian, virtue ethical, and intrinsic
consequentialist accounts are mistaken to suggest that the intrinsic value (or disvalue) of some
motives can ever be sufficient to explain why actions are right or wrong. The argument here is two-
pronged. First, he notes that such claims typically assume that intrinsically bad motives, such as
"prosecuting from malice," always lead to procedural violations, excessive cruelty, and the like (cf.
Slote 2001). Even if this assumption is warranted, that just shows that the extrinsic consequences
are what ultimately explain the moral wrongness of the act. And second, he argues that even if
some motives do have intrinsic value, no moral theory to date has provided an adequate account
of precisely how such motives affect the moral status of acts. Though readers who do not share
Sverdlik's intuitions about cases are unlikely to be fully convinced by this latter claim, he does at
least show that his own intuitions are plausible.
This brings us to Sverdlik's thesis about "availability," which is developed in Chapter 8. Here
Sverdlik shows that there are at least four different issues in play:
epistemic availability – whether the agent knows or believes she has reason to act.
affirmative availability – whether the agent consciously acts for that reason.
operative availability – whether the agent can ensure that his conscious ends are what actually
drive his behavior, and
affective availability – whether the agent has, or can muster up, the appropriate feelings or
emotional states.
Distinguishing these four issues is important to Sverdlik's project, since it provides him with further
reasons to find both Kantian and virtue ethical accounts inadequate (for the arguments, see pp.
149-66). But it is also important in a more general way. For there do seem to be cases in which
agents are aware of two or more competing desires (i.e., in which each desire is both affirmatively
and operatively available, and if they are emotional motives they will each be affectively available
too) and Sverdlik's account clearly shows that what is at stake for such agents is an epistemic
choice. Readers can appreciate this point even if they remain unconvinced that extrinsic
consequentialism does the best job of guiding such choices. And it is a point worth considering
even for those who doubt that moral theories can be action guiding at all. In such situations, there
is no way for agents to avoid the question of what they themselves ultimately believe they should
do.
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